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Online disinformation is a serious and growing sociotechnical problem that threatens the integrity of public
discourse, democratic governance, and commerce. The internet has made it easier than ever to spread false
information, and academic research is just beginning to comprehend the consequences. In response to this
growing problem, online services have established processes to counter disinformation. These processes
predominantly rely on costly and painstaking manual analysis, however, often responding to disinformation
long after it has spread.
We design, develop, and evaluate a new approach for proactively discovering disinformation websites. Our
approach is inspired by the information security literature on identifying malware distribution, phishing,
and scam websites using distinctive non-perceptual infrastructure characteristics. We show that automated
identification with similar features can effectively support human judgments for early and scalable discovery
of disinformation websites. Our system significantly exceeds the state of the art in detecting disinformation
websites, and we present the first reported real-time evaluation of automation-supported disinformation
discovery. We also demonstrate, as a proof of concept, how our approach could be easily operationalized in
ordinary consumer web browsers.
1 INTRODUCTION
Disinformation has emerged as a serious and growing abuse of technology, and it threatens the
integrity of public discourse, democratic governance, and commerce. Disinformation itself is not
new—the practice dates to at least classical antiquity, and in the following millennia it has been
a recurring instrument for international influence, domestic political advantage, and economic
gain [78, 97, 19]. In recent years, the disinformation landscape has rapidly and radically shifted:
The internet has made disinformation cheaper, easier, and more effective than ever before [58]. The
same technologies that have democratized online content creation, distribution, and targeting are
increasingly being weaponized to mislead and deceive. Russia notoriously deployed disinformation
to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election [90, 71, 105, 21, 47, 117], and political disinformation
campaigns have also struck dozens of other nations [11, 10]. Additional disinformation campaigns
have been economically motivated, driving valuable page views for advertising revenue, pushing
products or services, or undermining competitors [66].
The major online platforms have not kept pace. Responses to disinformation mostly rely on user
reports, manual analysis, and third-party fact checking, which are fundamentally slow and difficult
to scale [7]. These responses give disinformation an asymmetric advantage, enabling it to spread
and affect perceptions in the hours and days after it is first distributed—a critical period during
which disinformation may be most effective [122].
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This paper presents Disinfotron, a sociotechnical system that uses automated detection to surface
possible disinformation websites for human moderators. Disinfotron’s design is motivated by prior
work in the information security field that has demonstrated viable early detection for malware,
phishing, and scams using machine learning and a combination of carefully engineered network-
level and application-level features [43, 107, 102, 44]. Disinfotron uses similar insights to support
discovery of disinformation websites, and it refines its predictions by taking advantage of features
that become available at progressive stages of the website creation and distribution pipeline.
The design of Disinfotron is based on the intuition that there is a dichotomy between the human-
perceived characteristics of a website and the technical configuration of the website. A website
might appear to ordinary users as an authentic news outlet, but it might have distinct network-level
and application-level properties that should raise red flags for human moderators. Disinfotron
generates features from a website’s domain, certificate, and hosting properties, then applies multi-
label classification to categorize the website as disinformation, news, or other (i.e., lacking news
content). We use a machine learning approach that facilitates interpretability so that Disinfotron
can surface salient non-perceptual features for human moderators. Our evaluation shows that
Disinfotron significantly outperforms the state of the art on historical data and is effective in a
real-time pilot deployment.
In this paper, we make the following contributions:
• Identification of domain, certificate, and hosting features that distinguish disinformation,
news, and other websites.
• Disinfotron, a sociotechnical system for discovering possible disinformation websites that
can make a classification early in a website’s lifecycle and can progressively improve its
classification as the website becomes operational.
• Evaluation of Disinfotron’s performance on both historical and real-time data, demonstrating
that the approach is feasible, accurate, scalable, and inexpensive. We present what is, to our
knowledge, the first successful deployment of real-time disinformation discovery supported
by machine learning.
• Demonstration of how outputs from Disinfotron can be used in practice, including a proof-
of-concept browser extension that warns users before visiting a disinformation website.
• Publication of the Disinfotron dataset, the largest public corpus of manually labeled disinfor-
mation and news websites, accompanied by an archive of domain, certificate, and hosting
features for each website.
These contributions spanmultiple research areas. We add to the literature on computer-supported
cooperative work, both from the perspective of platform moderators and ordinary users. We show
that automation can support scalable human judgment for online disinformation, much like recent
work has shown that automation can support scalable judgment about deceptive or manipulative
e-commerce practices [67, 68]. We also demonstrate a plausible path for platforms and users to
navigate the complex cooperative work problem of disinformation [98].
We contribute to the interdisciplinary literature on news and disinformation by significantly
advancing the state of the art for automated detection of disinformation websites, demonstrating
the value of a new class of infrastructure features for disinformation detection, and reporting the
first instance of successful automation-supported discovery of disinformation websites. We also
provide the most comprehensive dataset of news and disinformation websites to date, along with
an archive of website features for future research.
In comparison to the information security literature, Disinfotron is the first system that leverages
threat detection methods to address the growing challenge of online disinformation. We overcame
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Fig. 1. The lifecycle of a disinformation website, from domain registration to content distribution. Disinfotron
attempts to surface possible disinformation websites for humanmoderators as soon as the domain is registered,
with progressively improving automated accuracy as the website deploys.
a number of significant technical challenges in adapting the combination of infrastructure fea-
tures and machine learning to the disinformation problem domain, including: constructing a new
real-time pipeline for surfacing possible disinformation websites and measuring associated infras-
tructure, rigorously refining infrastructure features (which produced a number of counterintuitive
results), assembling the largest reported dataset of disinformation and news websites, and carefully
structuring the machine learning problem to account for massive class imbalances.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our design goals and how we
approach the problem of disinformation detection. Section 3 on page 5 describes how we developed
a dataset of labeled websites for evaluating features and both training and testing automated website
classification. Section 4 on page 6 presents our feature engineering for distinguishing classes of
websites. Section 5 on page 12 presents our historical training dataset, Disinfotron’s design, and an
evaluation of the system’s automated detection performance on historical data. Section 6 on page 13
applies Disinfotron to real-time feeds from domain registration, certificate issuance, and social
media sharing, demonstrating that the system is effective in a real-time deployment. Section 7 on
page 16 discusses operational considerations, including how Disinfotron contends with adversarial
evasion. Section 8 on page 18 discusses related work, and Section 9 on page 19 concludes with a
discussion of possible future directions.
2 DESIGN GOALS AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
We are motivated by the urgent sociotechnical problem of online disinformation, the need for new
tools to assist human moderators in discovering disinformation campaigns, and the current asym-
metric disadvantage in defending against disinformation [62]. Improving disinformation detection
is essential for rebalancing the playing field, because detection must necessarily precede response
processes and interventions by registrars, certificate authorities, hosting providers, social media
platforms, search engines, browser vendors, extension developers, fact checkers, and journalists,
among other internet stakeholders.
Our design goals for Disinfotron are early detection, since the adverse effects of disinformation
appear to be concentrated in the period immediately following initial distribution, and progressive
detection, recognizing that additional features become available during the lifecycle of a disinfor-
mation website (Figure 1). We also aim for detection that is accurate, scalable, and low cost, since
the scale of new content on the web is vast and resources for countering disinformation—including
human moderator capacity—are comparatively limited.
We envision Disinfotron as a system that uses automation to support human moderators in
making judgments about potential disinformation websites. For example, a search engine might
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deploy Disinfotron by ingesting crawl data, predicting whether a newly seen domain is disinforma-
tion, and triggering human moderation if red flags are present. Similarly, a social network might
apply Disinfotron to shared links or a browser vendor might apply the system to domains that
users navigate. The output from an instance of Disinfotron could also have value throughout the
web ecosystem; it might trigger interventions by a platform or browser (like the proof-of-concept
browser extension that we present).
We emphasize that, at least for the near term, we do not envision Disinfotron as a fully automated
system. Disinformation is a complex sociotechnical problem that involves free speech, consumer
protection, and competition considerations (among other societal priorities). We expect that online
platforms will continue to require an exceptionally high degree of confidence and explainable
evidence before categorizing a website as disinformation. We also expect that platforms will
continue to rely on manual labeling for popular news and disinformation websites, which receive a
disproportionately concentrated volume of web traffic [116]. Our goal is an automation-supported
system that can discover new, comparatively less popular, or narrowly targeted disinformation
websites, prompting manual review of a website’s authenticity before it can become popular or have
widespread negative effects. Human moderation also acts as a backstop, minimizing the adverse
consequences of automated classification errors.
2.1 Scoping Disinformation
Definitions of disinformation vary in academic literature and public discourse [58]. Common
components include intent to deceive about facts [54, 108, 27, 45], intent to harm [108], and intent
to prompt distribution [62]. Many articles focus on “fake news,” also with varying definitions and
differing conceptions of how the category relates to disinformation [100]. For purposes of this
work, we use the term disinformation, and we define a disinformation website as a website that
appears to serve news about politics and current events, but that operates in a manner that is
significantly inconsistent with the norms, standards, and ethics of professional journalism.1 We
define this category as distinct from the category of legitimate news websites, including those with a
partisan bias, so long as they adhere to journalistic norms such as attributing authors, maintaining
a corrections policy, and avoiding egregious sensationalism.2 Our focus on websites related to
current events and politics is motivated by recent results indicating that a significant proportion of
the U.S. population has encountered these types of disinformation websites[37, 38, 5, 39, 4].
2.2 Website Domains as Granularity of Study
We study disinformation at the granularity of website domains, rather than individual articles,
claims, advertisements, social media accounts, or social media actions (e.g., posting or sharing).
Websites are a key distribution channel for disinformation and are often the subject of social media
activity [37, 38, 5, 4]. There is also very limited prior work applying automated methods to surface
disinformation at the domain level [8].
Focusing on domains has a number of benefits:
1We decline to use the term “fake news,” even though it may be a more apt description of the category of website that we
study, because of the term’s political connotations and because the system that we describe is generalizable.
2We note that a satire website can fall within our definition of disinformation if the satire is not readily apparent to
users. This is an intentional definitional decision, since satire websites can (and often do) mislead users [25, 55], and since
disinformation websites are increasingly relying on implausible small-print disclaimers that they are satire [75, 76]. Our
goal is to identify websites where users might benefit from additional context or other interventions. We do not take a
position on how internet stakeholders should respond to satire that risks misleading users, only that internet stakeholders
should have the opportunity to make an informed decision about how to respond to such websites.
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• Early Warning. It is possible, in principle, to identify disinformation websites before they
begin to publish or distribute content.3 Analysis of article content or social media activity, by
contrast, can only occur much later in the disinformation lifecycle (Figure 1 on page 3).
• Longer-Term Value. Disinformation articles and social media posts have an inherently
limited lifespan, owing to the rapid news cycle [122]. Disinformation websites, by contrast,
can last for years.
• Platform Independence. Identifying disinformation domains is feasible without access to
a major online platform’s internal account or activity data.
• Ecosystem Value. A real-time feed of disinformation domains has value throughout the
internet ecosystem, similar to existing feeds of malware, phishing, and scam domains [34].
Website data is immediately actionable for a diverse range of internet stakeholders.
In addition, websites are often a component of multimodal disinformation campaigns. Detection
at the domain level can provide an investigative thread to untangle the rest of a disinformation
campaign, including associated social media accounts and activities. And since false claims often
spread between disinformation campaigns, identifying a subset of campaigns provides valuable
features for identifying other campaigns.
There are drawbacks and limitations associated with focusing on domains. Some websites feature
a mix of authentic and false news, complicating our labeling task (discussed in Section 3). We also
recognize that disinformation websites are just one piece of the disinformation problem space, and
that social media likely plays a comparatively greater role in exposing users to disinformation and
inducing false beliefs. Our goal is tomake tangible progress on a discrete subset of the disinformation
problem space, highlighting a path forward for the broader field.
3 WEBSITE DATASET
We used both current and historical data to construct a dataset that includes three classes of
website: disinformation, news, and other. We identified three classes, rather than just two classes
of disinformation and non-disinformation, both to facilitate feature engineering and because we
found that cleaner class separation improved classification performance. We sought to balance the
three classes, ultimately including about 550 websites for each class.4
3.1 Disinformation Websites
We began by combining multiple preexisting datasets of disinformation websites that had been
manually labeled by experts or published by news outlets, research groups, and professional fact-
checking organizations. Specifically, we integrated the corpora from CBS [15], FactCheck.org [26],
Snopes [60], Wikipedia [111], PolitiFact [33], and BuzzFeed [94, 95, 96]. We also included websites
that have been labeled as “fake news” by OpenSources, a collaborative academic project that
manually assigned credibility labels to news-like websites [121]. Additionally, we incorporated
data from the NewsGuard browser extension [73], which provides credibility scores based on
observations by a team of fact-checkers. Finally, we integrated the list of disinformation websites
compiled by Allcott et al. for their study on the diffusion of disinformation on Facebook between
3For example, the automated component of Disinfotron might spot a new domain registration that looks like a local
newspaper name, but has infrastructure overseas. A human moderator might then investigate and find there is no local
newspaper with that name.
4We first constructed the disinformation class, then constructed the other two sets with equal sizes for balanced training
and testing. Class sizes changed slightly over the course of dataset construction, so the final datasets contain 551, 553, and
555 sites respectively. We recognize that the other website class would predominate in a real-time feed of domain, certificate,
or social media events. Our rationale is that without balancing the dataset, the classifiers we develop would minimize error
by simply labeling every website as other.
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2015 and 2018 [5], which they also compiled from lists by fact-checking organizations and academic
sources.
We then manually filtered the list of websites, leaving only the websites that satisfied our
definition of disinformation (Section 2.1 on page 4). This step included removing obvious satire
and hyperpartisan news, such as InfoWars and The Gateway Pundit. Our final dataset contains 769
disinformation websites. 582 (76%) of the websites are currently inactive: either unavailable, replaced
with a parking page, or repurposed for other kinds of abuse (e.g., spam or malware distribution).
This highlights the rapid turnover of disinformation websites in comparison to authentic news
websites. Fortunately, we were able to reconstruct domain, certificate, and hosting features for 364
(63%) of these inactive websites (described in Section 4), resulting in a final set of 551 disinformation
websites.
3.2 News Websites
We built a corpus of 553 authentic news websites, randomly sampling 275 from Amazon’s Alexa
Web Information Service (AWIS) [6] and 278 from a directory of websites for local newspapers, TV
stations, andmagazines [115]. FromAWIS, we sampled websites categorized as “news,” excluding the
100 most popular websites out of recognition that these websites likely have some distinct properties
compared to the long tail of news websites (e.g., high-quality and customized infrastructure). From
the local news dataset, we manually filtered to omit websites that did not prominently display news
(e.g., TV station websites that primarily served as channel guides).
3.3 Other Websites
We built a set of 555 other websites by sampling from Twitter’s Streaming API [104]. We filtered
for tweets that contained a URL, extracted the domain name, and then used the Webshrinker classi-
fication service [109] to assign labels based on the Interactive Advertising Bureau’s standardized
website categories [52]. We excluded websites that belonged to the “News” and “Politics” categories.
4 FEATURE ENGINEERING
In this section, we detail and evaluate the features that the automated component of Disinfotron
uses to classify disinformation, news, and other websites. We examine features in three categories:
• Domain. Features associated with registering and operating a domain name, including
properties of DNS registration, domain names themselves, and nameserver configuration
(Section 4.1 on page 8).
• Certificate. Features derived from TLS certificates, including certificate and certificate au-
thority attributes (Section 4.2 on page 10).
• Hosting. Features related to web hosting infrastructure, including both network-level and
application-level properties (Section 4.3 on page 10).
These three categories of features can be measured from a public internet host or acquired from
commercial services, are inexpensive to obtain, and are available early in the lifecycle of a disin-
formation website (Figure 1 on page 3), consistent with our design goals (Section 2 on page 3).
Additionally, because these features are related to a website’s infrastructure rather than its content,
they change (relatively) infrequently.
We are not able to extract every feature for every website. For example, some websites do not
offer TLS certificates, and some certificates are incorrectly formatted. In such cases, we mark the
type of data as missing through a boolean feature. Furthermore, some websites in our dataset
were inactive. To obtain features for these websites, we began by locating the most recent Internet
Archive Wayback Machine [53] snapshot from when a disinformation website was still active, and
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Name Category Description Rank Data Type
News Keyword(s) in Domain Domain The domain name contains one or more keywords that imply it
serves news (e.g., “herald,” “tribune,” or “chronicle”).
1 Boolean
Domain Name Length Domain The number of characters in the domain name. 3 Numeric
“News” in Domain Domain The domain name contains the specific keyword “news.” 8 Boolean
WHOIS Privacy Domain The domain registrant is using aWHOIS proxy service or registrar
privacy option.
9 Boolean
Registrar Name Domain The organization with whom the domain was registered. 11 Categorical
Nameserver SLD Domain The second-level domain of the nameserver. 14 Categorical
Nameserver AS Domain The autonomous system of the nameserver’s IP address. 16 Categorical
Registrant Organization Domain The organization of the registrant. 17 Categorical
Registrant Country Domain The country of the registrant. 19 Categorical
Time Since Domain Registration Domain The time elapsed since the domain was originally registered. 21 Numeric
Domain Lifespan Domain The time period between the domain’s initial registration and
expiration dates.
22 Numeric
Time to Domain Expiration Domain The time until the domain’s registration expires. 23 Numeric
Time Since Domain Update Domain The time since the domain’s configuration was updated. 25 Numeric
Nameserver Country Domain The country where the nameserver is located, using IP geoloca-
tion.
27 Categorical
Novelty TLD Domain The TLD is novelty (e.g., .news, .xyz, or .club). 29 Boolean
Digit in Domain Domain The domain name contains numeric characters. 30 Boolean
Hyphen in Domain Domain The domain name contains a hyphen. 31 Boolean
Domain Resolves Domain The domain name resolves to an IP address. 32 Boolean
SAN Count Certificate The number of domains in the Subject Alternate Name extension
field.
2 Numeric
SAN Contains Wildcard Certificate The Subject Alternate Name extension field contains a wildcard
entry for a domain.
7 Boolean
Expired Certificate Certificate The certificate is expired. 10 Boolean
Certificate Available Certificate A certificate is configured at the domain (i.e., a certificate is pro-
vided during a TLS handshake on the HTTPS port).
12 Boolean
Self-signed Certificate Certificate The certificate is signed by the domain owner, not a CA. 13 Boolean
Domain-validated Certificate Certificate The domain owner has proved ownership to the CA. 18 Boolean
Certificate Issuer Name Certificate The organization or individual who issued the certificate. 24 Categorical
Certificate Issuer Country Certificate The country where the certificate was issued. 26 Categorical
Certificate Lifetime Certificate The certificate’s period of validity. 28 Numeric
WordPress Plugins Hosting WordPress plugins used by the website. 4 Categorical
Website AS Hosting The autonomous system of the website’s IP address. 5 Categorical
WordPress CMS Hosting The website uses WordPress as its content management system. 6 Boolean
WordPress Theme Hosting The WordPress theme used by the website. 15 Categorical
Website Country Hosting The country where the website is located, using IP geolocation. 20 Categorical
Website Available Hosting A website is hosted at the domain (i.e., content is returned in re-
sponse to an HTTP request for the base URL, following redirects).
33 Boolean
Table 1. Domain, certificate, and hosting features that Disinfotron uses to classify websites as disinformation,
news, or other.
we retrieved raw HTML content that allowed us to generate hosting features. Next, we queried
the DomainTools API [22] to retrieve historical DNS and WHOIS records from the time that the
website was actively serving disinformation, enabling us to generate domain features. Finally, we
used the crt.sh Certificate Transparency log database [89] to recover the TLS certificate from
when the website was serving disinformation, allowing us to generate certificate features. Due to
the incompleteness of the historical records we obtain, we are not always able to reconstruct every
feature for inactive websites. In such cases, we mark the type of data as missing through a boolean
feature.
Table 1 presents the complete set of features that Disinfotron uses to classify websites. We
compute feature rankings by training a multi-class random forest model and computing mean
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Rank Disinformation News
1 GoDaddy GoDaddy
2 Enom Network Solutions
3 Namecheap MarkMonitor
4 FastDomain CSC Corporate Domains
5 LaunchPad (HostGator) Enom
Table 2. Top domain registrars used by disinformation websites and news websites in our historical data.
decrease impurity for each feature (Section 5.1 on page 12). The rest of this section examines the
features that Disinfotron uses for classification.
4.1 Domain Features
Any public website with a domain name necessarily relies on the DNS infrastructure. The domain
name itself provides information about the website, and the process of registering the domain
reveals information about the registrar (the service provider where the domain namewas registered),
the registrant (the individual or organization who registered the domain), and the circumstances
of registration (such as the initial date of registration). DNS also provides information about the
authoritative nameservers used by the website. We use these domain properties to engineer a set
of features that can distinguish disinformation, news, and other websites.
Registrar. We use the WHOIS protocol [49, 20] to identify the registrar for each domain in our
labeled website dataset (Section 3 on page 5). We found that the vast majority of domains for
each website class rely on a relatively small set of registrars. In particular, ≈84% of disinformation
websites, ≈90% of news websites, and ≈82% of other websites use the top three registrars for their
respective classes. The set of popular registrars is, however, somewhat distinct for each class. Table 2
presents the most common registrars used by disinformation and news websites. GoDaddy is the
most popular registrar for all three classes of website, but certain other registrars have distinct usage
patterns for each category. Namecheap and Enom, for example, are low-cost and consumer-oriented
registrars; our dataset indicates that they are rarely used by news websites. By contrast, Network
Solutions is a more expensive and business-oriented registrar, and both MarkMonitor and CSC are
exclusively directed at businesses with valuable brands; we find that disinformation websites rarely
use these registrars while they are common for news websites.
Registrant. We also use the WHOIS protocol to identify the registrant of each domain. Registrant
data is not consistently available; it is often obscured by WHOIS proxy services [110, 48] or,
increasingly, registrar privacy options.5 Prior work has demonstrated that the DNS records for
abusive websites often mask the registrant’s identity [13, 14]. We find a similar pattern of WHOIS
privacy adoption among disinformation websites; in our historical dataset, 57% of disinformation
websites useWHOIS privacy.6 Newswebsites, by contrast, tend to include identifying information in
domain registration records; only 9% of news websites use aWHOIS privacy service.We hypothesize
that operators of disinformation websites use WHOIS privacy services to avoid culpability, similar
to operators of other abusive websites. News websites, on the other hand, have an incentive to
5ICANN recently implemented a specification that provides free WHOIS privacy, in order to comply with the European
Union’s General Data Protection Regulation [101, 24]. We note that this development is no more of an obstacle to Disinfotron
than preexisting WHOIS privacy services, because the new specification allows ICANN, registries, and registrars to disclose
WHOIS information for purposes of combating abuse.
6Our set of keywords for determining whether a domain registration uses a WHOIS proxy or privacy option will be available
with our source code upon publication.
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Fig. 2. Examples of features with differing distributions among disinformation, news, and other websites.
disclose registrant information both to demonstrate authenticity and to provide a technical point
of contact in the event of a DNS configuration issue.
Registration. Information about a domain registration can also provide useful features about a
website. For example, news website domains are often over a decade old—just like the associated
news organizations. News websites also tend to have domain expirations far in the future, since
news organizations plan to continue operations and do not want to inadvertently lose their domains.
Disinformation websites, by contrast, often have recently registered domains because the websites
are new fabrications. Disinformation websites also tend to have near-term domain expirations,
presumably because the domain holds little inherent or long-term value—most traffic will originate
from social media activity rather than recurring visits, and the website will foreseeably have to
shut down or switch domains once it has been widely outed as disinformation. Figure 2shows the
distribution of the duration between initial domain registration and expiration for each class of
website; news websites have domains with significantly longer lifespans.
Domain Name. The domain name itself, of course, includes valuable features for distinguishing
classes of websites. The domain name of a news website often includes the term “news” and, since
it tends to follow the name of the organization that operates the website, frequently includes news
related keywords like “herald,” “tribune,” or “chronicle.” News websites also tend to use a popular
top-level domain; in our labeled website dataset, 83.5% of news websites have a .com domain.
Disinformation websites also frequently use news keywords in their domain names, since they
intend to appear as news websites. For example, 20 disinformation websites in the dataset used by
Allcott et al. [5] are registered to domains following the convention channelxxnews.com, where
xx is a two-digit number intended to appear as an authentic television channel. We also observe
that disinformation websites sometimes make use of newer TLDs, including .news, .xyz, or .club,
where more domain names that have the appearance of news websites may be available.
Nameserver. Every public website has an authoritative nameserver (or set of nameservers) that
resolves the website’s domain name to an IP address. We perform DNS queries to both identify
the first nameserver for a website and obtain that nameserver’s IP address. Our dataset indicates
that disinformation websites tend to use inexpensive and mass-market nameserver providers.
These providers are often associated with the website’s hosting platform, such as Cloudflare,
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HostGator, or BlueHost, or the website’s domain registrar, such as DomainControl (GoDaddy) or
Namecheap. News websites also frequently use these providers, but they also use a distinct set of
business-oriented nameserver providers such as NS1 or Qwest (CenturyLink).
4.2 Certificate Features
Websites are increasingly supporting encrypted and authenticated public access using HTTPS [80,
31]. Implementing HTTPS requires obtaining and configuring a TLS certificate; these steps in-
herently reveal properties of the issuing certificate authority (the service provider that validates
the domain owner) and of the certificate itself (such as the period of validity and the extent of
validation). The following features are exemplary of what we can extract from TLS certificates.
SAN Count. The Subject Alternate Name (SAN) extension in a TLS certificate enables sharing
one certificate across multiple domains. In a conventional TLS deployment, the SAN field describes
the set of domains that belong to a single organization. Increasingly, infrastructure providers use
this field to efficiently facilitate hosting multiple domains with shared infrastructure. Cloudflare,
for example, automatically includes dozens of customers in a shared certificate unless a customer
pays extra for a dedicated certificate [80]. Our intuition was that news websites are more likely to
manage their own certificates or purchase dedicated certificates, while disinformation and other
websites are more likely to use convenient and inexpensive (or free) shared certificates.
Figure 2b on the previous page compares the distribution of the number of domains in a certificate
SAN field between the three classes of websites. The results show that, contrary to our intuition,
news websites are more likely to have a crowded SAN field than disinformation websites. We find
that some parent news organizations have configured certificates that cover a large number of
subsidiary news organizations.
Configuration Errors. We initially hypothesized that disinformation websites would be more
likely to feature certificate misconfigurations, since they are not managed by professional news
organizations. For example, the certificate for the disinformation website empirenews.net does
not include that domain in the subject name or SAN field, and the certificate is also not signed by
a trusted certificate authority. Both of these errors would cause a web browser to warn the user
when navigating to the website.
We found that, contrary to our intuition, certificate configuration errors are similarly rare in all
three classes of websites. This result may be because certificates are increasingly managed with
automated platforms that avoid misconfiguration, or because certificate errors are easy to detect (a
website becomes unavailable over HTTPS) and easy to correct.
4.3 Hosting Features
The third feature category that we examine relates to a website’s hosting infrastructure. These
features typically become available after a domain name is registered and a certificate has been
issued, but before content is added or the website circulates on social media. We focus on hosting
features related to where in the internet topology the server is located, where geographically the
server is located, and how content is managed on the website.
Content Management Systems and Plugins. Many websites are built with content management
systems (CMSes), application-level platforms that define the style and layout of the website and
facilitate publishing and organizing content. Our intuition is that disinformation websites may
be more likely to use a free CMS than authentic news websites, more likely to use CMS plugins
for social media integration (rather than build the integration themselves) and search engine
optimization (since disinformation websites are aggressive about content virality), and more likely
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Rank Disinformation News
1 Cloudflare (13335) Lee Enterprises (10668)
2 GoDaddy (26496) Amazon (16509)
3 Google (15169) Amazon (14618)
4 Unified Layer (46606) Incapsula (19551)
5 Namecheap (22612) Cloudflare (13335)
Table 3. Top autonomous systems used for hosting by disinformation websites and news websites in our
historical data.
to use a variant of a stock CMS theme (rather than designing a new theme themselves). For example,
the disinformation website freeinfomedia.com runs the free WordPress CMS, has added the
facebook-comments plugin, and uses the inexpensive mts-best theme. We use CMS fingerprinting
to detect whether a website is running WordPress, which popular plugins are installed, and which
theme is active.7
We find, consistent with our intuition, that WordPress adoption is much more common among
disinformation websites (82%) than news websites (20%). We also find that the distribution of
WordPress plugins significantly differs between news and disinformation websites. Disinformation
websites, for example, disproportionately use the seo (search engine optimization tools), jetpack
(administrative tools), and contact-form-7 (simplified contact forms) plugins, while news websites
tend to not use popular WordPress plugins. WordPress themes had less value in distinguishing
classes of website, since themes are often unique or renamed, but we did find that stock or inexpen-
sive news-like themes (e.g., Newspaper, mh-mag, and Newsmag) were much more common among
disinformation websites than news or other websites.
Hosting Provider and Location. We use DNS to resolve the IP address for each website in our
labeled website dataset. We then use BGP routing tables to map the IP address to an autonomous
system (AS) and the MaxMind GeoLite2 database to map the IP address to a country. Our intuition
is that disinformation websites will disproportionately use hosting providers that are inexpensive
and mass-market, or that are located outside the United States.
We find that a small proportion of ASes host the vast majority of websites across all three
classes. In particular, ≈86% of disinformation websites, ≈84% of news websites, and ≈80% of other
websites are hosted on the top three ASes for their respective classes. The prevalence of each AS,
however, varies significantly by class. Table 3 presents the most common ASes for disinformation
and news websites. Consistent with our intuition, inexpensive and mass-market hosting providers
like GoDaddy and Namecheap are much more common among disinformation websites than news
websites [72, 50]. By contrast, news websites make more frequent use of premium, business-oriented
hosting providers like Incapsula [51]. We also find that some ASes are highly predictive of news
websites. For example, the ASes for Lee Enterprises and Central Newspapers—a pair of news holding
companies—are used almost exclusive for news websites [9, 63, 72].
We also find, contrary to our intuition, that geographic location of the hosting provider is not a
particularly valuable feature. The overwhelming majority of websites in all three classes are hosted
in the United States.
7We additionally implemented CMS fingerprinting for Drupal and Joomla, but we found that those CMSes were rare in
our dataset. We also implemented a test for reuse of Google Analytics IDs, hypothesizing that networks of disinformation
websites might duplicate analytics code. We found, however, that only one pair of websites had identical Google Analytics
IDs. We omitted all of these features from Disinfotron because of their low predictive value.
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Fig. 3. Disinfotron performance on our training dataset. Figures 3a and 3b show performance on all three
classes using all feature types. Figures 3c and 3d show performance on the disinformation class using subsets
of features.
In the previous section, we examined domain, certificate, and hosting features that show promise
for distinguishing disinformation, news, and other websites. In this section, we explain how we
used the features to build a machine learning model. We describe our classifier and then we present
an evaluation of the model’s performance.
5.1 Classifier
The automated component of Disinfotron uses supervised machine learning to classify websites as
disinformation, news, or other. We formulated the machine learning task as multi-class classification
because humanmoderatorsmight want to verify or label newswebsites in addition to disinformation
websites, and because we found that cleaner class separation improved classification performance.
We chose a random forest classifier so that results from Disinfotron are readily explainable to
human moderators (see Section 7 on page 16).8
8Other approaches to supervised machine learning, such as deep learning, can result in models that are difficult to
interpret [61].
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We set the hyperparameters for Disinfotron by conducting a randomized search over a wide
range of values for each hyperparameter. We performed 250 iterations of 5-fold cross validation,
selecting the hyperparameters that maximize average accuracy. We also conducted this search with
each category of features, training a new model each time. We modularly built the classifier using
scikit-learn to enable reproducibility and encourage future work [77].
5.2 Performance
We evaluate the performance of the automated component of Disinfotron based on the classifier’s
true positive rate (i.e., recall), false positive rate, and precision using mean values from 5-fold
cross-validation.
First, we assess classification performance for each class of website. Figure 3a on the facing page
presents the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve and area under the curve (AUC) for
each class. Figure 3b on the preceding page presents the precision-recall (P-R) curve and average
precision (i.e., the area under the P-R curve) for each class. We find that Disinfotron is able to
effectively distinguish between the three classes of websites.
Our results significantly advance the state of the art in automated classification of disinformation
and news websites. The most recent published work in the area used a combination of article text,
URL, Twitter presence, Wikipedia presence, and web traffic ranking features, and it reported its
most effective classifier as having a macroaveraged F1 of 0.599 and accuracy of 0.655 [8]. While
our results are not quite one-to-one comparable, since we use slightly different class definitions9
and datasets,10 for the primary purpose of detecting disinformation websites our classifier offers
unambiguously far greater performance.
Next, we evaluate the importance of each category of features. Figure 3c on the facing page
presents the ROC curve and AUC for each of the feature categories when detecting disinformation
websites, as well as the ROC curve and AUC for all feature categories combined. Figure 3d on
the preceding page presents the corresponding P-R curves and average precision scores. We find
that domain features predominantly drive classification performance, which validates our design
goal of enabling early warning for disinformation websites. Domain features are available early in
a disinformation website’s lifecycle, and domain registrars and registries (among other internet
stakeholders) could plausibly intervene when a suspicious news-like domain name appears. We
also find that hosting features can accomplish moderate classification performance. Certificate
features, by contrast, do not appear to be as promising a direction for disinformation classification.
6 PILOT TEST OF REAL-TIME DISINFORMATIONWEBSITE DISCOVERY
In this section, we present an end-to-end, real-time pilot test of Disinfotron. We show that the
automated component of the system is capable of surfacing potential disinformation websites for
human moderation, and that human moderators can rapidly respond to those flagged websites.
This work is, to our knowledge, the first reported instance of a successful real-time disinformation
detection system.
6.1 Implementation
The implementation of our Disinfotron pilot test operates in four stages: domain ingestion, feature
extraction, classification, and human moderation (Figure 4 on the following page).
9The prior work did not include a class of other websites, and it included three classes of website factuality rather than just
news and disinformation.
10The prior work reused just one existing dataset, and it did not filter the dataset for consistency.
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Fig. 4. The processing pipeline for our end-to-end pilot test of real-time disinformation website discovery,
followed by example uses of the system’s output.
Domain Ingestion. Disinfotron starts by ingesting live feeds of candidate domains. We have
selected an initial set of feeds that span the early stages of a disinformation website’s lifecycle:
domain registration, certificate issuance, and website deployment (Figure 1 on page 3).11 The earliest
data source is DomainTools, which notifies Disinfotron when a domain with a news keyword is
newly registered [22].12 The next data source is CertStream, which alerts Disinfotron of newly
issued TLS certificates [12]. The latest stage data sources are Twitter and Reddit [86], from which
Disinfotron ingests posting activity that involves URLs.13
Feature Extraction. Next, our implementation of Disinfotron issues DNS queries, initiates a TLS
handshake, and submits web requests to the candidate domain. The implementation uses the
responses to those automated probes to generate the domain, certificate, and hosting features
described in Section 4 on page 6. Our implementation archives the raw data and features for
every website that it encounters, in order to facilitate human moderation, future refinement of
the classifier (e.g., additional manual labeling), and longitudinal study (e.g., long-term trends in
disinformation website volume, infrastructure, and content).
Classification. Our implementation next uses the extracted features as input to the classifier
described in Section 5 on page 12, classifying the website at the domain as disinformation, news, or
other.
Human Moderation. Finally, we manually reviewed a sample of classification output to simulate
how an online platform might evaluate possible disinformation websites. We also reviewed samples
of news class and other class websites for evaluation completeness.
6.2 Evaluation
We conducted our pilot test by running Disinfotron for five days with all four domain feeds. We split
Disinfotron across two enterprise servers; one server ingested domains and extracted features, while
the other performed classification. Each server had two 8-core, 2.6GHz CPUs (Intel Xeon E5-2640)
and 128GB of RAM. Disinfotron processed 1,326,151 unique domains over the course of 1 week in
February 2019.
In order to evaluate the automated components of the pilot implementation, we randomly
sampled 100 websites from each detected class and labeled them manually. We only considered
11Our pilot implementation of Disinfotron is easily extensible to additional feeds of candidate domains.
12We have omitted a link to our list of news keywords to preserve author anonymity. The list will be available with our
source code upon publication.
13Tweets are from the Twitter Streaming API and are not filtered by language or geography. Reddit posts are from the
Reddit API.
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Fig. 5. Disinfotron automated performance on a manually labeled subset of real-time Twitter data.
websites sourced from Twitter for purposes of the evaluation, since we could most accurately
label websites with all three sets of features.14 Our methodology was also motivated by one of our
intended use cases for Disinfotron—human moderators at a social media platform labeling websites
that had been automatically flagged.
Figure 5 presents a confusion matrix for automated classification of the domains in our manually
labeled Twitter sample.15 We find that performance is radically degraded in comparison to our
prior evaluation, which we hypothesize is attributable to two primary causes. First, there is massive
class imbalance in the websites shared on Twitter; the overwhelming majority of websites are not
in the disinformation class. Second, there is a risk of bias when assembling a historical dataset
of news and disinformation websites. Those websites are often identified through commonalities
(e.g., part of the same corporate family or network of websites), and those commonalities are
susceptible to overfitting. Future work should carefully examine the differences between the
historical disinformation classification task and the real-time disinformation discovery task.16
Nevertheless, despite the significant drop in performance, we found that the classifier’s precision
on the disinformation class (0.09) was sufficient to validate our system design. Our simulated
moderators were able to rapidly evaluate the flagged websites and, just in the small-scale human
moderation step of our pilot test, discovered 2 disinformation websites that had not been previously
reported in any public venue.17 Both websites featured overt false claims and misleading headlines,
and both websites clearly satisfied our definition of disinformation (Section 2.1 on page 4).
Table 4 on the following page presents the overall automated classification results from the pilot
test using three subsets of features, each reflecting a distinct stage of the disinformation website
14In our envisioned deployment of Disinfotron, some sophisticated platforms might be able to make reliable determinations
about a website’s class even without hosting or certificate features. In most circumstances, a domain flagged on the basis of
pre-content features would be subject to routine probes and would be reclassified when content appears.
15Our classifier predicts a class by calculating the highest mean probability across the trees in the forest.
16We note that prior work on disinformation has paid surprisingly little attention to machine learning task formulation,
sample bias, and overfitting. For example, prior work on disinformation article classification tends to use articles from the
same websites in training and test splits, and some work even explicitly encodes the website as a feature or in an embedding.
These approaches are highly susceptible to overstating performance. We encourage the disinformation research community
to join us in attempting realistic evaluation of research approaches.
17We conducted web searches for these domains and did not find any results identifying them as disinformation websites.
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Lifecycle Stage Disinformation News Other
Domain Registration 183,339 (13.4%) 95,578 1,088,141
Certificate Issuance 176,747 (13.1%) 111,667 1,061,747
Content Deployment 136,550 (10%) 120,168 1,069,433
Table 4. Classification results from a real-time deployment of Disinfotron over five days.
lifecycle. First, we demonstrate results on domain features, which would be available to a domain
registrar or registry. Next, we show results on certificate and domain features, which would be
available to a certificate authority when it issues a TLS certificate. Finally, we present results with
all categories of features, which would be available to a browser vendor, search engine, or social
media platform once a website has distributed content. The combination of our evaluation on
manually labeled data and our overall classification results suggests—though we carefully note,
it does not prove18—that a large number of disinformation websites have not yet been labeled in
public datasets.
6.3 Proof-of-Concept Browser Extension
We anticipate that Disinfotron’s output would be valuable to a broad range of internet stakeholders
(Figure 4 on page 14). As one example, the system could be a basis for browser-based warnings to
users.
We developed a proof-of-concept Google Chrome extension to confirm the ease of triggering
user notification on the basis of Disinfotron’s output. When a user who has installed the extension
navigates to a website that Disinfotron has identified as potential disinformation (based on a
dynamically updated domain list), the extension inserts an interstitial warning as shown in Figure 6
on the facing page. If the user clicks the “Learn more” option, the interstitial page explains that
the website was identified as disinformation using a semi-automated disinformation detection
system. Clicking “Details” will explain why the website was initially flagged as disinformation by
the automated component of Disinfotron (specifically, the top three features for classification) and
provide an option for the user to continue to the website. Clicking “Back to safety” will navigate
the browser back to the previous website. The visual style of and user choices on the interstitial
page are directly based on the Chrome warning for malware and phishing websites.
There are a variety of ways that this intervention could be improved, such as by adding more
details about the classification or allowing users to offer feedback. We leave the question of how
to optimize warning effectiveness open for future work; previous research on browser warnings
for other security issues such as SSL errors [3] and malicious domains [23] may suggest fruitful
directions.
7 DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss our view on the role of human review in Disinfotron and the possibility
of disinformation websites attempting to evade the automated components of the system.
Human Review. Content moderation has high stakes. Removing authentic news, satire, or political
commentary—no matter how partisan or ideological—risks undermining free speech. And any
classifier, including the classifier used in Disinfotron, will likely have a significant volume of
false positives. Our view is that, at least for the foreseeable future, automated disinformation
18Our manually labeled sample of websites is small, drawn only from Twitter, and not a random representative sample of
websites.
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Fig. 6. The interstitial warning that the proof-of-concept browser extension displays to a user when visiting a
disinformation website surfaced by the Disinfotron pilot test.
detection systems should not replace human moderators. Rather, automated systems should support
moderators in making rapid, correct, and substantiated decisions.
In the Disinfotron design, we envision automated identification of potential disinformation
websites early in their lifecycle, followed by periodic automated reevaluation of those websites for
new features or more confident classification, and then eventual alerting for moderators if there is
sufficient cause for concern. Our end-to-end pilot test suggests that this cooperative approach to
disinformation website detection could radically reduce workload for human moderators.
Evasion. Disinformation websites will naturally be motivated to evade detection bymajor internet
stakeholders. In other areas of online abuse, such as spam, phishing, and malware, new defensive
measures are constantly developed and deployed to keep up with advances in adversary capabilities.
We expect that disinformation will follow a similar cat-and-mouse pattern of defense and evasion.
The automated component of Disinfotron uses features that provide a degree of asymmetric
advantage in identifying disinformation websites, since a website that seeks to evade detection
must make changes to its infrastructure. Some features will be relatively easy to evade; for example,
a website can easily change a WordPress theme or renew an expired TLS certificate. Fortunately,
many of the most important features that Disinfotron relies on are difficult or costly to evade.
For example, one of the most predictive features is the lifespan of a website’s domain. Evading that
feature requires either significant advance planning or purchasing an established domain.19 Evading
certain other features incurs monetary costs, like purchasing a certificate from a reputable issuer,
registering a domain for a longer time, switching to a more expensive non-novelty TLD, or migrating
to a more trustworthy hosting provider. Evading other features incurs technical costs: obtaining
and installing a correctly configured, reputably issued TLS certificate, for instance, imposes some
operational cost and may not be possible if the domain has no reputation. Finally, evading many of
Disinfotron’s features might reduce the effectiveness of the disinformation campaign. For example,
a top ranked feature is whether a domain contains news keywords. Removing those keywords from
the domain name could diminish the credibility of the website and lead to less exposure on social
media.
19If an adversary were to resort to purchasing established domains, the natural countermove would be refining the domain
lifespan feature by detecting when a website has changed ownership. This is exactly the type of cat-and-mouse pattern we
envision.
18 Austin Hounsel, Jordan Holland, Ben Kaiser, Kevin Borgolte, Nick Feamster, and Jonathan Mayer
8 RELATEDWORK
There is prior work related to Disinfotron in the areas of disinformation measurement, detection,
and labeling, as well as in the area of online abuse detection more generally.
Disinformation Ecosystem Measurement. Prior work has measured dimensions of the disinfor-
mation ecosystem. Starbird et al. presented a case study of online discussion of the Syrian White
Helmets, and found that a small number of websites and authors generate most content [99].
Marwick and Lewis assessed internet subcultures that create and share disinformation [66]. Guess
et al. examined the spread and reach of disinformation on social media in the U.S. during the
2016 election and found that one in four Americans visited a fake news website [39]. Fletcher
et al. performed similar analysis on disinformation in Europe and found that the most popular
disinformation website in France reached 1.5 million people [30]. Several research groups have
developed methods for mining disinformation data to build reference datasets [92, 93, 91].
Automated Disinformation Detection. Previous publications have examined the textual content
of articles to detect disinformation [82, 81, 46, 91, 74, 112, 16, 18, 88, 87, 119, 65]. Potthast et al.
distinguished hyper-partisan news articles from mainstream articles, but could not distinguish
disinformation from hyper-partisan news [79]. Similarly, Afroz et al. used stylometric techniques
to identify disinformation articles with 96.6% accuracy [2] but achieved only 57.1% precision. These
results illustrate the difficulty of detecting disinformation based on content.
Other previous projects on article classification relied on contextual features in addition to
content [18], such as article appearance (e.g., number of references or length) [59], social network
analysis (e.g., user relationships, hashtags, or interactions) [40, 120], information propagation
patterns [114, 64, 113], and stylistic features such as the emotional tone of the writing [69, 85].
Another strand of scholarship has produced automated methods for identifying individual false
statements, with limited success [106, 17, 35, 41, 103].
In the prior work that is most similar to Disinfotron, Baly et al. predicted the factuality of
reporting from a given news outlet by examining articles, the outlet’s Wikipedia and Twitter
pages, its URL, and characteristics of its Web traffic for a combined accuracy of around 50% [8]. As
described above, our implementation significantly exceeds this prior state of the art result.
Finally, there are parallels between disinformation detection and efforts to flag fake online
reviews of products and businesses. Prior work has proposed classifiers using both lexical [28, 29]
and contextual [112] features to address the problem.
We emphasize that, in comparison to prior work, Disinfotron is the first system to use infras-
tructure features. We also present the first reported evaluation of (and success at) disinformation
detection on real-time data.
Disinformation Labeling. Zhang et al. convened journalists, fact-checkers, and researchers to
develop a set of 16 indicators of article credibility [118]. The authors released a dataset of 40
annotated articles on climate science and public health, and they measured which labels correlated
with article credibility. In the CREDBANK project, researchers trained Amazon Mechanical Turk
workers to label the credibility of events discussed on Twitter [70]. The dataset includes over 1,000
events and 60 million tweets, but the study was specific to social sharing behavior and does not
generalize to disinformation websites. We contribute to the literature on disinformation labeling
with the largest reported dataset of news and disinformation websites.
Abuse Detection. Our approach of distinguishing malicious activity through infrastructure fea-
tures has been used for abuse detection since at least 2006, when Ramachandran and Feamster
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identified that spammers exhibit network-level behavior that is distinct from other types of le-
gitimate email senders [83]. A key result from their work was that a disproportionate fraction of
spam activity originates from a small number of autonomous systems. Subsequently, network-level
features have also been used to distinguish spam from legitimate email [44], fingerprint botnets [36,
84], identify scam activity [56, 42], and detect websites that host unlawful content [57]. Most
recently, Hao et al. demonstrated that spammer domain registration patterns can predict email
scam campaigns, because domains used in email scams are often registered in batch and contain
distinct lexical properties [43].
9 CONCLUSION
Online disinformation is a serious and growing societal challenge. Although the problem has
attracted research and industry attention in recent years, existing approaches to automated or
semi-automated disinformation detection have not seen much real-world adoption. We propose a
new and viable approach to the subproblem of discovering disinformation websites: Disinfotron, a
sociotechnical system that is fast, scalable, and inexpensive.
Our work demonstrates that disinformation websites rely on different infrastructure from au-
thentic news websites, and that supervised machine learning can use that difference for automated
identification. In our evaluation, we show that Disinfotron is both accurate on historical data and
viable in an end-to-end, real-time pilot deployment. We are, to our knowledge, the first to report
successful real-world results from a semi-automated system for discovering disinformation websites.
We urge that future research on disinformation detection include similar realistic evaluation owing
to the likely inconsistencies between historical classification tasks and real-time discovery tasks.
Future work on Disinfotron could include integrating additional infrastructure features, such as
DNSSEC or email configuration, or analyzing longitudinal trends. Incorporating features derived
from published content (e.g., natural language or perceptual properties) or extracted from content
distribution (e.g., social media sharing or consumption patterns) would also be a natural extension
to improve Disinfotron’s performance in later stages of the disinformation website lifecycle.
Beyond the specific semi-automated detection approach that we explore, we believe that our work
demonstrates a promising new direction for the disinformation problem domain. Our experience in
developing Disinfotron has been that the challenges of identifying and responding to disinformation
websites have deep parallels to the challenges of countering spam, malware, phishing, and other
long-studied threats at the intersection of human-computer interaction and information security.
Disinformation is not identical to these prior problems, to be sure, but we believe we are just
scratching the surface of what the combination of HCI and information security can contribute to
addressing this acute societal problem.
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